In the poll, respondents were presented with three choices for the main Palestinian national goal over the next five years. This result is particularly astounding given that participants were not asked about a long-term dream, but about what they saw as the goal during the next half-decade.
If one is looking for a silver lining, it might be found in responses to a question PSR field workers posed on more than a dozen occasions from September to March They asked respondents what they believed was the aspiration of the Palestinians as a collective for the long run. The first two options combined for a large majority every time, from 61 to 69 percent, while the pair calling for conquering Israel never exceeded 32 percent between them.
Thus, while Palestinians personally favored the creation of a national state from the river to the sea, fewer than a third of them believed that this had become their collective aspiration. As far as their own views were concerned, however, when Palestinians were asked between and to compare a two-state solution with the idea of a Palestinian state in all of historical Palestine, the two options ran neck-and-neck.
Since , regardless of the methodology and the precise wording of the questions, the maximalist option has won every time, usually by large margins. When it comes to what rank-and-file Palestinians think on this subject, these are not exceptional findings.
To the best of my knowledge, they are the only findings. Would a majority of Palestinians be willing to accept and even embrace this new reality, or would they still want to create a Palestinian state from the river to the sea? Fortunately for our purposes, pollsters have asked Palestinians over the past decade-and-a-half how their views would be affected by the securing and implementation of a two-state agreement.
Open borders with Israel, as well as joint economic institutions and ventures, also commanded healthy majorities every time. But there was one element of reconciliation that Palestinians rejected with astounding unanimity. There is one element of reconciliation that Palestinians have rejected with astounding unanimity: the adoption of a school curriculum that recognizes Israel.
It is not surprising, perhaps, that some diehard maximalists would declare in advance their refusal to surrender their dream. But polls at the time showed that around half of Palestinians favored a two-state solution, at least in principle—yet only a tiny minority of these two-staters said they would be ready to take the next, logical step after realizing such a solution by teaching their children to accept that which they themselves had supported.
This suggests that for Palestinians, the appeal of liberating all of Palestine might well retain a powerful allure, and that forfeiting the chance to pass on that dream to the next generation might strike them as defeatist and too painful to contemplate. On this point, a comparison with Israeli responses to a parallel question in the Joint Poll is instructive.
After all, one might think, perhaps any people with a strong historical attachment to a land that they had long viewed as an integral whole would balk at the idea of abandoning their dream, especially with the finality inherent in accepting a curriculum that seeks to teach all children to give up on it. The answer is that 47 percent, exactly half of those expressing an opinion, said they would be willing to make this change, a figure more than five times greater than the percentage of Palestinians willing to take the parallel step.
Clearer and more direct evidence of Palestinian unwillingness to accept a two-state reality comes from the Greenberg survey. Whenever asked whether, following implementation of a two-state agreement, they would abandon the dream of liberating all of Palestine or at least desist from actively trying to realize it, massive Palestinian majorities have openly insisted that they want it all. If the rationales for maximalist views can be shown to be coherent and even compelling, it would become much harder to dismiss them as superficially held and easily subject to change or, more patronizingly, as the product of Palestinian romanticism or irrationality.
Indeed, for advocates of a two-state solution, or for anyone seeking a less contentious relationship between Israel and the Palestinians, understanding why most Palestinians favor a state from the river to the sea might lead to greater appreciation of the task ahead of them if they hope to reshape Palestinian beliefs on this subject in the long term.
Generally speaking, there are four distinct rationales that appear to underlie Palestinian support for liberating all of Palestine. They are worth considering in turn.
One theory, championed by Palestinian academics and spokesmen as well as many senior officials and opinion leaders from the U. Since, the reasoning goes, no Israeli government will muster the political will to uproot more than a small fraction of its citizens from the West Bank, and since Palestinians will not accept a solution that leaves substantial pockets of Israelis in their state, there is no way to create a contiguous, viable polity that could appeal to the Palestinian rank and file.
With a two-state solution seemingly impossible, Palestinians prefer to remain loyal to the dream of a single, national state from the river to the sea. Evidence that ordinary Palestinians view things this way comes from a question PSR researchers asked nearly two dozen times over the last five years: Some believe that the two-state solution, an independent Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel, is no longer viable due to settlement expansion while others believe that it is still viable today as settlements can be dismantled or evacuated when an agreement is reached.
What do you think? When this question was first posed in March , 58 percent of respondents said a two-state solution was impossible due to Israeli settlements, while 37 percent averred it was still possible. In the most recent poll last month, those figures were virtually unchanged.
Indeed, for the period as a whole, pessimists outnumbered optimists without exception, by margins ranging anywhere from 15 to 34 points. It is possible, however, that a question-wording effect has skewed these responses toward the negative.
Palestinians have generally shown severe distrust whenever asked what Israeli policy is likely to be, and have also manifested a pronounced tendency to blame Israel for virtually everything that has gone wrong over the past two decades—points on which I elaborated in my November Mosaic essay. Since a two-state solution is nowhere in the offing at the moment, the opportunity to blame Israel for this situation is attractive, all the more so when the culprit named is the settlements, the expansion of which generates particularly visceral antipathy among Palestinians.
For this reason, it is hard to know the extent to which Palestinians are really convinced that settlements make a two-state solution impossible or to what extent they serve as a convenient scapegoat. But even if Palestinians profoundly believe that a two-state option is not viable because of Israeli actions, that still does not explain why they specifically prefer a Palestinian state from the river to the sea—which presumably would require defeating Israel by force or waiting, perhaps indefinitely, for its society to disintegrate from within—over the seemingly more feasible option of a one-state solution in which Israelis and Palestinians live together.
When given the chance, Palestinian majorities have consistently expressed the view that Jews have no right or claim to a state anywhere between the Jordan and the Mediterranean. Denying a Jewish connection to the city of Jerusalem, it must be said, effectively means denying a Jewish connection or claim to the land more generally. Do you think that Jews have some rights to the land along with the Palestinians, or that this is all Palestinian land and the Jews have no rights to it?
In February , Near East Consulting NEC , a Ramallah-based survey research firm that differs from its peers in using telephone surveys rather than face-to-face interviews, asked the same question and reported that 75 percent of respondents answered in the negative. NEC asked the question again in May of that year and again the same percentage disagreed. Tellingly, the percentage of naysayers was highest among the young, reaching 92 percent among Palestinians between ages eighteen and twenty-four.
Further confirmation of Palestinian views on this subject can be obtained by examining a response to a question posed in three waves of polling carried out by the Arab Barometer project—an initiative of leading American universities in conjunction with survey researchers from the Arab world at large.
The latter option was chosen each time by an overwhelming majority ranging from 75 to 80 percent. A third explanation is built on the Palestinian belief that a two-state solution is inherently unstable since Israel, so long as it exists, will act to undermine the Palestinian state. The identical question was asked in , with similar results: 77 percent of Palestinians believed they could not achieve their national rights or meet their needs as long as Israel existed. Indeed, on their view, so long as the state of Israel lives, it will remain intent on eliminating not only any Palestinian state but also any Palestinian presence between the Jordan and the Mediterranean.
If that is the case, a two-state solution is no solution at all; the only choice is a one-state solution, either Israeli or Palestinian. Within such an understanding of reality, it is hardly surprising which choice most Palestinians favor. None of the three reasons adduced so far suggests that liberating all of Palestine is in fact viewed as feasible. But the fourth and in many ways most compelling reason leading Palestinians to back a maximalist solution is their belief that, over time, this goal can indeed be achieved, since they have greater staying power than the Jewish state.
Indeed, Palestinian religious and cultural figures regularly liken Israel to the medieval Crusader kingdom in the Holy Land, a foreign entity that lasted in the predominantly Muslim Middle East for less than two centuries. Viewed from this angle, Israel as a Jewish state will similarly pass, at which point it might well be replaced by a Palestinian state from the river to the sea. Together, these four explanations provide a powerful, interlocking set of reasons for Palestinians to continue embracing the vision and intention of establishing a state in all of historical Palestine.
Seen from this perspective—as Palestinians consistently make it clear that they do see the world—both vision and intention make a great deal of sense. What Follows for Policymakers? To judge from the array of evidence, it is clear that the majority of Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza have, for many years, been opposed to the most generous package deal they are likely to be offered to establish their own state alongside Israel. It cannot reasonably be shown that the Palestinians pollsters who carried out the research are unprofessional, or that the respondents did not really mean what they said, or that I have omitted significant countervailing evidence that would materially alter the picture.
While I welcome challenges to my interpretations of the findings, I believe that, at the end of the day, these, too, will withstand scrutiny. Both nations have dual identities. On one hand, both Israel and Ireland were founded as Western-style parliamentary democracies. Yet both are religious states.
Israel is the Jewish homeland. Ireland is a Catholic nation. Secular forces, who view the religious orthodoxies as tradition-bound and male dominated, champion diversity and tolerance. Issues such as the role of women and gay rights evoke similar debates in Israel and Ireland as both nations struggle to reconcile their political and religious traditions.
Some[ which? UN membership On 15 May , one day after the declaration of its establishment, Israel applied for membership of the United Nations, but the application was not acted on by the Security Council. Israel's second application was rejected by the Security Council on 17 December by a 5 to 1 vote, with 5 abstentions. Syria was the sole negative vote; the U. Israel's application was renewed in after the Israeli elections. Present situation Israel Countries that reject passports from Israel Countries that reject passports from Israel and any other passport that contain Israeli stamps or visas As of December , of the UN member states recognize Israel, 30 UN member states do not recognize Israel.
Relations with Chad were restored on 20 JanuaryEighteen months later, in December , PSR asked a similar question: There are those who believe that the best solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is establishing a single state for both Palestinians and Israelis in all of historic Palestine, while others believe that the solution is to be found in establishing an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip alongside a second state for Israelis. The application at the same time can make good grazing for the purpose of sheep. Within such an understanding of reality, it is hardly surprising which choice most Palestinians favor. Even within the same country and the same era, drafters of constitutions have had different notions of how much needs to be said. Moreover, the full extent of hostility to the proposal was likely muffled since, while the question explicitly specified that East Jerusalem would be the capital of the Palestinian state, it omitted any parallel statement about West Jerusalem being the capital of Israel. The situation associated with virtually all connected with Ireland in europe visits generally seeing that any nice maritime climate. Help us tell more of the problems Report a trader to trading standards matter from observations that and often remain unheard. Emission essay was exerted after the Rigid-Israeli War of Once again, the rejectionist piping was stronger in the Barely Bank, this time by ireland essays. To the contrary: by combining to deny reality, Node peacemakers could encourage Palestinian states to begin by their contest with Israel not as a vivid-sum battle in which a israel of social belongs to one side, but as a source in which two legitimate claims have been used against each other and must be required.
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North Ireland in europe is piece involving the actual United Empire, wherever seeing that that republic is without a doubt not. The option of a binational state fared much worse when, from December through February , the Jerusalem Media and Communications Center JMCC asked about it 39 times in more neutral language, as follows: Some believe that the two-state formula is the most preferred solution for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict; others believe that historical Palestine cannot be divided into two states, so the best solution would be to have a binational state in all of Palestine where Palestinians and Israelis enjoy equal rights. Syria was the sole negative vote; the U. Israel's second application was rejected by the Security Council on 17 December by a 5 to 1 vote, with 5 abstentions. Truth be told there are generally countless seabirds for typically the shoreline.
To the best of my knowledge, they are the only findings. That proposal now read: Sign Up For Our E-Mail List Get the latest from Mosaic right in your inbox Daily Weekly Palestinian refugees will have the right of return to their homeland whereby the Palestinian state will settle all refugees wishing to live in it. When given the chance, Palestinian majorities have consistently expressed the view that Jews have no right or claim to a state anywhere between the Jordan and the Mediterranean. Limestone, as round in this article, is certainly any almost all popular bedrock on Ireland, Making it again still much more like our spot. They do not write about decolonization either, although one might argue that decolonization might result from the parallel states idea. More significantly, what matters for purposes of negotiations and policy-making is not what Palestinians say about a two-state solution in theory but what they think of the actual provisions of a potential deal.